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JURY INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING ADDICT-INFORMANTS
United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
Payne, being tried for violations of the federal narcotics laws, re-
lied upon a defense of entrapment.' The sole government witness to
the alleged entrapment was Roscoe, a paid govenment informant who
was an addict. After becoming an informant, Roscoe was released
from jail, and the criminal charges pending against him were reduced.'
The trial judge refused to allow the defense to prove Roscoe's status as
an addict, or to elicit testimony from a law enforcement agent that ad-
dicts are unreliable generally. The trial judge gave a special caution-
ary instruction on the unreliability of informants, but did not give a
special cautionary instruction on the unreliability of informants who
are also drug addicts.3 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals re-
versed and held: If the testimony of an addict who is a paid informant
with criminal charges pending against him is substantially uncorrobo-
rated, the court must give, on request, a special cautionary instruction
on the unreliability of that addict-informant.4
1. The thrust of the defense of entrapment is whether the defendant was induced
rather than predisposed to commit the crime. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958). See Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems In Criminal
Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM L. REv. 399 (1959). Roscoe alone had visited Payne on a
number of occasions to arrange the sale of narcotics. Therefore, Roscoe's testimony
was critical with regard to Payne's defense of entrapment, since Roscoe was the only
prosecution witness who could testify that Payne was not induced to commit the
crime. United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2. United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3. Id. at 569.
4. Before this instruction is given, the informant's status as a drug addict must
be proved. Id. at 569. For the purpose of appeal the court assumed that Roscoe was
an addict since defense counsel's inquiry into Roscoe's addiction had been erroneously
halted by the trial judge. Id. at 575.
Defense counsel did not request a special instruction on the unreliability of addicts
and therefore did not precisely comply with Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that the question of the special
cautionary instruction was properly before it since the trial court had ruled that the
evidence concerning Roscoe's addiction was inadmissible. Id. at 569 n.7.
Judge Bazelon believed that a trial court must provide a cautionary instruction as
to the reliability of informant-addicts sua sponte, whereas Judge Leventhal thought
that such an instruction should be given only if requested by the defense counsel and the
addict's testimony is uncorroborated. They agreed, however, in the instant case to
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Generally, in determining a witness's credibility, only evidence tend-
ing to verify or disprove the accuracy, truthfulness, or sincerity of the
witness may be considered. Evidence of bias is one means of attack-
ing the credibility of a witness,6 and, if bias is proven, the impeached
reverse Payne's conviction and order a new trial in which evidence concerning the
informant's status as an addict would be admissible. There is some support for Judge
Bazelon's contention that the trial court must provide the instruction sua sponte.
See McMillen v. United States, 386 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1031 (1968) (accomplice instruction); United States v. Griffin, 382 F.2d 823 (6th
Cir. 1967) (informant instruction); Williamson v. United States, 332 F.2d 123 (5th
Cir. 1964) (accomplice instruction). However, the majority rule is to the contrary.
See note 7 infra.
Co-defendant Kinnard's conviction was affirmed because he never met alone with
Roscoe, and therefore with respect to Kinnard, Roscoe's testimony was corroborated.
Thus, the credibility of Roscoe was not a material factor in the prosecution's case
against Kinnard. United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
5. See Roberts v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 362 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Mo. 1962);
Webb v. State, 445 P.2d 531, 532 (Okla. Crim. 1968); Sturdevant v. State, 49 Wis. 2d
142, 147, 181 N.W.2d 523, 526 (1970). See also 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 460 (1957).
Credibility may be attacked by showing that the witness has made prior statements
inconsistent with his present testimony. E.g., Smallfield v. Home Ins. Co., 244 F.2d
337, 339 (9th Cir. 1957); Webb v. State, 445 P.2d 531, 532 (Okla. Crim. 1968).
See also C. McConigcn, EvminNca § 35 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCozMIcK];
3 J. WIGMOR, EvDENcE §§ 1017-46 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMoRE.]
Specific error may be shown by proving that the facts are not as the witness testi-
fied. See, e.g., Smailfield v. Home Ins. Co., 244 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir. 1957). See
also MCCORMICK § 47; 3 WIGMORE §§ 1000-07.
The witness's credibility may be attacked by showing that he is of unsound char-
acter. See MCCoRMCK §§ 42-44; 3 WIGMoRE §§ 910-30.
It may be shown that due to some defect the witness cannot properly observe, re-
member or recount the matter about which he is testifying. For cases concerning per-
sons under the influence of alcohol, see, e.g., Rheaume v. Patterson, 289 F.2d 611
(2d Cir. 1961) (capacity to observe impaired at time of accident); State v. Browning,
98 Ohio App. 8, 128 N.E.2d 173 (1954) (evidence of possible intoxication at time of
robbery admissible); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Martin, 478 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Ct.
Civ. App. 1972) (dictum); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Amer. v. Marshall, 308 S.W.2d
174 (Tex. CL Civ. App. 1957) (dictum). See also McCoR I K § 45; 3 WGMOm
§ 933.
For cases concerning persons with mental derangements, see, e.g., Garrett v. State,
268 Ala. 299, 105 So. 2d 541 (1958) (fit of derangement at time of event or at least
before trial would be admissible); People v. Lambersky, 410 Iln. 451, 102 N.E.2d 326
(1951) (feeble-minded person who has capacity to observe, recollect, and communicate
may testify). See also 3 WIrMORE § 932. See generally id. at § 931.
6. It may be shown that the witness is biased because the defendant previously
had repulsed his homosexual advances. Tinker v. United States, 417 F.2d 542 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969); Salgado v. United States, 278 F.2d 830
(lst Cir. 1960).
See also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1970) (court must allow
full cross-examination of co-indictee who had already pleaded guilty, concerning his
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party is entitled to a special cautionary instruction, on request, con-
cerning the unreliability of the uncorroborated testimony of biased wit-
nesses.' Bias may manifest itself as the self-interest of a witness who
is paid,8 who has charges pending against him,9 or who is an in-
attempt to obtain favorable ruling from the Securities Exchange Commission); Wynn v.
United States, 397 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (defendant may prove bias of prosecu-
tion witness arising from altercation over stolen whiskey prior to trial); Villaro-
man v. United States, 184 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (defense may show that wit-
ness had filed a related civil suit against defendant for the alleged assault); State v.
Matejka, 186 Neb. 454, 183 N.W.2d 917 (1971) (fact that policeman witness kicked
defendant six times and threw him into a ditch at time of arrest may be shown to
prove bias). See generally MCCORMICK § 40; 3 WIGMORE §§ 948-53.
7. See Mathes, Jury Instructions and Forms for Federal Criminal Cases, 27
F.R.D. 39, 68 (1960): "All evidence of a witness whose self-interest or attitude is
shown to be such as might tend to prompt testimony unfavorable to the accused,
should be considered with caution and weighed with great care." See, e.g., Egan V.
United States, 287 F. 958 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (accomplice instruction); Freed v. United
States, 266 F. 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1920) (accomplice instruction). For cases outlining
proper accomplice instructions, see Matthews v. United States, 319 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir.
1963); Babb v. United States, 252 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1958). But see United States v.
Jones, 425 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1970) (accomplice instruction need not be given
where testimony is corroborated and no request for instruction is made). See generally
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs,
60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Note, The Effect of an Accused's Interest on His Credibility
as a Witness, 74 DICK. L. R.v. 691 (1970).
For cases holding that a special cautionary instruction must be given on the unre-
liability of an informant's uncorroborated testimony, see United States v. Masino,
275 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1960); Fletcher v. United States, 158 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir.
1946); Crowe v. State, 84 Nev. 358, 441 P.2d 90 (1968). See also Lujan v. United
States, 348 F.2d 156 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 889 (1965) (dictum); Jordan
v. United States, 345 F.2d 302 (10th Cir. 1965) (dictum); Hardy v. United States,
343 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965) (dictum).
If the informant's testimony is corroborated, it is not error if the special instruction
is not given. Lujan v. United States, 348 F.2d 156 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 889 (1965); Jordan v. United States, 345 F.2d 302 (10th Cir. 1965); Todd v.
United States, 345 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1965); Hardy v. United States, 343 F.2d 233
(D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965); Orebo v. United States, 293
F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1961). Likewise, if no request for a special instruction on the un-
reliability of informants is made, it is not error if the special instruction is not given.
Dawkins v. United States, 324 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1963). For cases where there was
no request for instruction and evidence was corroborated, see Sartain v. United States,
303 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1962); Young v. United States, 297 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1962);
Joseph v. United States, 286 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1960); Cratty v. United States,
163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
See generally Donnelly, supra; Note, Informers in Federal Narcotics Prosecutions,
2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 47 (1966).
8. E.g., Wheeler v. United States, 351 F.2d 946 (Ist Cir. 1965) (court must
allow cross-examination of witness to ascertain whether he would claim informers' re-
ward in tax evasion case); Dixon v. State, 40 Ala. App. 465, 115 So. 2d 262 (1957)
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formant.'0 Since testimony concerning the veracity of narcotics ad-
dicts generally will not be admitted,"- if an informant is also a drug
(instruction must be given on request regarding pecuniary interest of witness as it
might affect his credibility). See also MCCORMICK § 40; 3 WIGmORE § 969.
9. E.g., Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931) (defense allowed to show
witness under arrest for another offense); Spaeth v. United States, 232 F.2d 776
(6th Cir. 1956) (prosecution witness with hope of early parole). For treatment of
testimony by accomplices, see, e.g., Marsh v. United States, 402 F.2d 457 (9th Cir.
1968); Matthews v. United States, 319 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Babb v. United
States, 252 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1958); Egan v. United States, 287 F. 958 (D.C. Cir.
1923); Freed v. United States, 266 F. 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1920). Contra, People v.
Weber, 191 App. Div. 271, 181 N.Y.S. 774 (1920) (fact that witness in rape case in-
dicted for raping another woman in car at same time excludable). See also
McCORMICK § 40; 3 WIGMORE § 967.
10. United States v. Masino, 275 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1960); Fletcher v. United
States, 158 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Crowe v. State, 84 Nev. 358, 441 P.2d 90
(1968). See Lujan v. United States, 348 F.2d 156 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
889 (1965); Jordan v. United States, 345 F.2d 302 (10th Cir. 1965); Todd v.
United States, 345 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1965); Hardy v. United States, 343 F.2d 233
(D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965); Dawkins v. United States,
324 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1963); Sartain v. United States, 303 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1962);
Young v. United States, 297 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1962); Orebo v. United States, 293 F.2d
747 (9th Cir. 1961); Joseph v. United States, 286 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1960); Cratty v.
United States, 163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See generally Note, Informers in
Federal Narcotics Prosecutions, 2 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 47 (1966).
11. Kelly v. Maryland Cas. Co., 45 F.2d 782 (W.D. Va. 1929), aff'd, 45 F.2d
788 (4th Cir. 1930); Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831 (Alaska 1971); People v. Buono,
191 Cal. App. 2d 203, 12 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1961); People v. Bell, 138 Cal. App. 2d 7,
291 P.2d 150 (1955); People v. Williams, 6 N.Y.2d 18, 159 N.E.2d 549, 187 N.Y.S.2d
750, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 920 (1959). It appears that there is no medical consensus
that addicts are unworthy of belief. Kelly v. Maryland Cas. Co., 45 F.2d 782 (W.D.
Va. 1929), aff'd, 45 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1930); People v. Buono, 191 Cal. App. 2d
203, 12 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1961). Some courts do not allow evidence that drugs affect
the veracity of an addict on the ground that it is a collateral matter. E.g., State v.
King, 88 Minn. 175, 92 N.W. 965 (1903).
Contra, State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 P. 233 (1916) (court must allow
evidence that witness was an opium eater since addicts are notorious liars living in a
dream world); People v. Smith, 38 Ill. 2d 237, 231 N.E.2d 185 (1967); People v.
Lewis, 25 II. 2d 396, 185 N.E.2d 168 (1962) (prosecution witness must bare arms to
see if he is an addict since drug addicts are notorious liars); Beasley v. State, 404 P.2d
911 (Nev. 1965) (indicates that principal prosecution witness would have to bare
arms); Edwards v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 105, 181 N.W.2d 383 (1970).
See also MCCORMICK § 45; 3 WIGMORE § 934; 20 A.L.R.2d 684 (1968); 52
A.L.R.2d 848 (1957); Rossman, The Testimony of Drug Addicts, 3 ORE. L. REv. 81
(1924); Note, Testimonial Reliability of Drug Addicts, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 259 (1960);
Comment, 60 COLuM. L. REv. 562 (1960); Comment, 16 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 333
(1943); Comment, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 742.
It may always be proved that the witness was under the influence of drugs and
thereby could not properly observe, remember, or recount the matter he is testifying
about. Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563 (1913); People v. Bell, 138 Cal. App. 2d
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss4/9
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addict, the cautionary instruction normally deals only with the wit-
ness's status as an informant. 12
In Kinnard, Judge Bazelon reasoned that the informant who is also
an addict requires special consideration, because the addict is in the
7, 291 P.2d 150 (1955). See also United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir.
1969); People v. Williams, 6 N.Y.2d 18, 159 N.E.2d 549, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750, cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 920 (1959); State v. Jiron, 26 Utah 2d 311, 489 P.2d 109 (1971);
McCoRMICK § 45; 3 WIGMORE § 934; Note, Testimonial Reliability of Drug Addicts,
35 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 259 (1960); Comment, 16 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 333 (1943); Comment,
1966 UTAH L. Rav. 742.
While there is a difference of opinion on the question of whether the status of
being an addict renders the addict untrustworthy, other persons with suspect status are
not generally deemed untrustworthy. Generally, addiction to alcohol does not involve
the veracity trait, and is inadmissible to prove untruthfulness. See, e.g., People v.
Stanley, 206 Cal. App. 2d 795, 24 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1962); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v.
Martin, 478 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1972) (evidence of general habit of in-
toxication may not be received); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Amer. v. Marshall, 308
S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1957). See also 3 WIOMORE § 933. Contra,
State v. Browning, 98 Ohio App. 8, 128 N.E.2d 173 (1954) (evidence on habit of
sobriety bears on credibility).
Evidence of a witness's status as a homosexual is irrelevant to show untruthfulness.
Salgado v. United States, 278 F.2d 830 (1st Cir. 1960); United States v. Provo, 215
F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954). See Tinker v. United States, 417 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969); United States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 930 (1968). See also People v. Lewis, 25 Ill. 2d 442,
185 N.E.2d 254 (1962) (where prosecutrix's testimony is clear, uncontradicted, and
corroborated, defense can not establish that she is a nymphomaniac); Garrett v. State,
268 Ala. 299, 105 So. 2d 541 (1958) (cannot impeach witness by showing general
mental derangement); People v. Lambersky, 410 Ill. 451, 102 N.E.2d 326 (1951)
(feeble-minded condition of witness goes to the issue of his credibility).
McCormick rejects the harsher treatment afforded narcotic addicts in certain juris-
dictions, and suggests that evidence of drug addiction to prove veracity should always be
excluded since there is no medical consensus to warrant judicial notice that the mere
status of drug addiction affects credibility. McCoRMacK § 45, at 98. For judicial dis-
cussion on the lack of medical consensus, see Weaver v. United States, 111 F.2d 603,
606 (8th Cir. 1940) (court may not instruct jury that it might consider witness's mor-
phine addiction on the issue of his credibility since there is no medical consensus that
the use of morphine affects credibility); Kelly v. Maryland Cas. Co., 45 F.2d 782
(W.D. Va. 1929), ajfd, 45 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1930); People v. Williams, 6 N.Y.2d 18,
159 N.E.2d 549, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 920 (1959). See generally
TI PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FoRCE REPORT: NARcorics AND DRUG ABUSE (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE REPORT]; Frankel, Narcotic Addiction, Criminal Responsibility and Civil Coin-
mitment, 1966 UTAH L. RyV. 581.
12. See Godfrey v. United States, 353 F.2d 456, 458 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Fletcher v. United States, 158 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (the fact of addiction
merely gives added reason to give the informant instruction); Crowe v. State, 84 Nev.
358, 441 P.2d 90 (1968). See also Matthews v. United States, 319 F.2d 740 (D.C.
Cir. 1963) (accomplice-addict).
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perpetual status of violating the law, leaving him subject to arrest.
That threat of arrest is a special form of harassment to the addict, be-
cause it forces him to undergo withdrawal. 13  At this point, a bribe of
heroin or a promise of release, enabling him to return to his habit, is
irresistible in exchange for information.' 4 Further, offers of leniency
from the severe penalties for narcotics violations to addicts under in-
dictment effectively induces information and cooperation.' 5 The ad-
dict is valuable to the police and will maintain his favorable status with
them only if he produces tips leading to prosecutions. If, however, he
fails to produce convictions, the addict will lose his favored status and
will again be subject to police harassment. Not only will the addict be
desperate to produce results for the police, but he will also avoid "fin-
gering" powerful figures in the drug trade who could harm him.'0
Judge Bazelon reasoned that these conflicting pressures will likely lead
the addict to lie and implicate innocent persons.
Two cases decided in the District of Columbia Circuit have a direct
bearing on Kinnard. In Fletcher v. United States,'7 the defendant was
convicted primarily upon the uncorroborated testimony of a paid inform-
ant who was also an addict. The court held that it was reversible error
for the trial court to have refused a requested instruction on the unrelia-
bility of an informant.' 8 The court stated that if an informant is an
13. United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1972). As au-
thority for this position, Judge Bazelon cites A. LINDEsMiTH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW
46 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LiNESMITH]; TASK FORCE REPORT at 10. Mr.
Lindesmith holds a Ph.D. in sociology, is a professor of sociology, a member of the Na-
tional Association for the Prevention of Addiction to Narcotics, a member of the Inde-
pendent Citizens Council on Crime and Delinquency, and was a delegate to the 1962
White House Conference on Drug Abuse. The Task Force Report was a joint under-
taking of federal, state, local, and private agencies and groups, consultants, advisers,
and the staff of the Commission.
"The deliberate harassment of addicts for information, through illegal searches, ar-
rests, and general intimidation by police and other officials has been reported."
United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566, 572 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Judge Bazelon cites
LINDESMITH at 36-37; J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WrrHoUT TRIAL 143-55 (1966) [herein-
after cited as SKOLNICK]; TASK FORCE REPORT at 8. Mr. Skolnick, a sociologist
and instructor at Yale Law School, obtained his information through observational
techniques of police behavior.
14. Judge Bazelon cites T. DUSTER, LEGISLATION OF MORALITY-LAw, DRuGs
AND MORAL JUDGMENT 194 (1970); LINDESMITH at 44, 47, 50-51.
15. Judge Bazelon cites LINDESmlTrH at 48-49; SKOLNICK at 124-26; TASK FORCE
REPORT at 8.
16. Judge Bazelon cites SKOLNICK at 132-33.
17. 158 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
18. Id. at 322.
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addict, there is all the more reason to give an instruction on informants
since "a drug addict is inherently a perjurer where his own interests are
concerned."'19 In Godfrey v. United States,2" numerous addicts testi-
fied-defense witnesses, an informant, and the defendant. The trial
court instructed the jury that, "It is recognized that a drug addict is in-
herently a perjurer when his own interests are concerned and his testi-
mony should be received with suspicion and acted upon with cau-
tion."'" The court of appeals held that instruction improper "since
the latter's 'interests' were not 'concerned' in the sense or degree that
the Appellant's interests were involved."2
In finding that the instruction should have been given, Judge Baze-
Ion correctly distinguished Godfrey on the ground that the instruction
in Godfrey was improper because it attempted to discredit the testi-
mony of all drug addicts, whereas in the instant case the instruction
would have been pointed only at the paid informant with charges
pending against him.2" In Fletcher, however, the court made it clear
that the status of addiction only provided added reason to give a spe-
cial instruction on informants, and should not itself be included in the
instruction. 24  Since there appears to be no precedent to support Kin-
nard, the soundness of the decision must be judged in light of the ra-
tionale articulated by Judge Bazelon. If his assumptions about the
manner in which police procure addict-informants and the pressures
which bear upon the actions of addict-informants are correct, the spe-
cial cautionary instruction seems appropriate. If Judge Bazelon is cor-
19. Id.
20. 353 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
21. Id. at 458.
22. Id.
23. United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566, 572 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
24. Godfrey v. United States, 353 F.2d 456, 458 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (emphasis
original):
In Fletcher v. United States . . . Judge Groner said, in relation to a caution-
ary instruction about the credibility of paid informants testimony:
And when this is added the well recognized fact that a drug addict is in-
herently a perjurer where his own interests are concerned, it is manifest
• . . that it should be received with suspicion and acted upon with caution.
The correctness of this holding is not in issue. What we hold now is simply
that it was error for the Trial Judge to couch his "cautionary instruction" to
the jury about addicts in the same terms as the appellate rationale for the
need for an instruction about the testimony of paid informants who are ad-
dicts. Fletcher is thus a narrow holding and its primary thrust is a cautionary
instruction on the reliability of paid informants generally, not addicts; the
thrust of Fletcher is that where the paid informant is also an addict there is
"added" reason for a cautionary instruction.
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rect, the potential harm to a defendant from unreliable testimony is
considerable. On the other hand, if the assumptions are incorrect, the
harm to the state is minimal since the instruction does not completely
eliminate use of addict-informants2 5 Thus it is submitted that despite
a lack of empirical data to support Judge Bazelon's assumptions,2 6 the
special cautionary instruction should still be given.
25. Complete elimination of the use of informers would be a severe blow to the
police. "95% of all federal narcotics cases are obtained from the work of informers."
Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecu-
tions, 28 FoRDHAM L. REv. 399, 403 (1959). "Without a network of informers-usu-
ally civilians, sometimes police-narcotics police cannot operate." SKOLNICr at 120.
26. Only one of the authorities cited by Judge Bazelon as a basis for determining
the need for the special instruction, the Task Force Report, is based to any degree on
empirical data. The other authorities are sociologists who based their conclusions on
less than overwhelming evidence. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. There-
fore, their analysis should be considered in light of the point of view from which they
analyzed the problem of narcotics-informers, which may or may not include consider-
ations or problems of law enforcement and proper criminal procedure.
797
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